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THE  NATIONAL  PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: 
HARMFUL OR HELPFUL   IN   THE   HANDS  OF   THE   CONSUMER? 
Connie J. Bullock* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet's powerful ability to quickly disseminate vast amounts of 
information to so many people has changed every aspect of our lives, 
including how we "shop" for medical care.  For years, patients wanting 
disciplinary information on their physicians had to write to their state 
medical board to request it.  Since the advent of the World Wide Web, the 
same information that ten years ago would have taken weeks to track down and 
obtain is often accessible by entering a few simple computer keystrokes. 
In an effort to meet the public's demand for information on physicians 
and their practices, on September 7, 2000, Representative Tom Bliley (R-Va)1, 
Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, introduced the Patient Protection 
Act of 20002.  His proposal sought to amend the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA)3 by allowing public access to health care 
practitioner information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank 
(NPDB) - - a creation of the HCQIA.  Under current regulations, the data 
bank's contents are open only to those whose records are at issue and to 
* LL.M. Candidate, 2001, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., 1990, Florida 
State University, College of Law.  Lieutenant Commander Bullock is currently 
on active duty with the United States Navy, and is a member of the Judge 
Advocate General's Corps.  The opinions expressed in this article are solely 
those of the author. 
1
 Congressman Bliley has since retired. 
2
 Patient Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 5122, 106th Congress.  As of April 17, 
2001, no similar bills had been introduced during the 2001-2002 Congressional 
session. 
certain health care providers to furnish supplemental information for use in 
the decision-making processes accompanying physician hiring and privileging 
actions. 
Opponents severely criticized the proposal claiming, among other 
things, that its introduction was a political maneuver designed to redirect 
attention from the Patients' Bill of Rights4 (which, at the time, was stalled 
in negotiations in both houses of Congress), but Representative Bliley 
defended his proposal.  The information available in the data base is needed 
because, he said, "with so many people covered by HMO's, they may well not 
know the surgeon who is about to operate on them."5  It is "unconscionable 
that consumers have more comparative information about the used car they 
purchase or the snack foods they eat than the doctors in whose care they 
entrust their health and well-being."6 
As practically motivated as Representative Bliley may have been, he was 
forced to grapple with the fine line that exists between providing 
information that is helpful and that which is harmful to the consumer.  His 
opponents quickly pointed out that it is not always the case that "the more 
information available about ^health care providers' (physicians, hospitals, 
insurance companies, etc.) irrespective of its content, the better off 
patients will be."7  Representatives of the American Medical Association 
3
 The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101-52 
(1995) (HCQIA) .  The HCQIA was approved as Title IV of Pub. L. 99-660, 100 
Stat. 3784 (1986). 
4
 Susan J. Landers, AMA Renews Attack on Bill  to Open National  Practitioner 





 Associated Press, Database  Tracks Doctors'  Problems   (June 29, 2000),, 
http://msnbc.com/news/427175.asp. 
7
 American Medical Association (AMA) Board of Trustees Report 31-1-00 from D. 
Ted Lewers, M.D., Chair, Board of Trustees, to David T. Hannan, M.D., Chair, 
(AMA) and the American Hospital Association (AHA), the two most vociferous 
opponents of the proposal, questioned whether disseminating the kind of raw, 
non-synthesized data available through the NPDB would help the HCQIA and the 
NPDB meet their common goal of improving the quality of health care. 
Instead, they suggested that reports on credentials and privileging actions 
would provide a more accurate reflection of a physician's competence than 
would the medical malpractice payment reports which make up the bulk of NPDB 
entries, the latter of which are easily subject to misinterpretation.9 
Representative Bliley's proposal eventually died in committee, but it 
is doubtful that at the time of its introduction, he could have imagined the 
amount and kind of critical attention his bill would focus on the National 
Practitioner Data Bank.  Critics of his bill offered but a glimpse into the 
many problems which plague the NPDB which, according to several recent 
reports, make it unreliable as a consumer resource for information on health 
care practitioners.  Both sides of the debate seemed to agree that patients 
have a right to know information about disciplinary actions and "properly 
expressed" malpractice payments10 concerning a physician who is taking care of 
them.  The problem, however, is in finding and agreeing on the best resource 
to provide it.  Rather than look to the NPDB, many used Representative 
Bliley's proposal to argue that consumers should look to State medical boards 
Reference Committee B (Dec 4, 2000) at  http://www.ama- 
assn.org/meetings/public/interimOO/reports/hodactions/annocb.pdf. 
8
 Public Availability of Physician  Information in National  Practitioner Data 
Bank:     Hearing on H.R.   5122 Before  the House Comm.   On  Commerce,   106th Cong. 
(2000) (statement of Richard F. Corlin, M.D., President-Elect, American 
Medical Association); Public Availability of Physician  Information in 
National  Practitioner Data Bank:     Hearing on H.R.   5122 Before  the Subcomm.   on 
Oversight and Investigations  of the House Comm.   On  Commerce,   106th Cong. 
(2000) (statement of Rodney Hochman, M.D., Chief Medical Officer and Senior 
Vice President, Sentara Healthcare).  Both of these statements are 
unpublished, but are available online at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/legislative.html. 
9
 Id.; see infra  notes 33-36, 60-61 and accompanying text. 
10
 See infra  notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
or private sector organizations which have either been tasked with or 
voluntarily undertaken collection of licensure and disciplinary information 
on their licensees.11 
There remains a strong public demand for accurate, reliable, relevant, 
and contextual information on .health care providers, but how do we strike the 
balance between helpful and harmful consumer information?  How do we provide 
what consumers want, and reconcile that with the competing concerns which 
control accessibility? 
To better understand the recent debate and concerns over the content of 
the NPDB, Part I of this paper will review the history of the NPDB and its 
status following 10 years of operation.  Part II will focus on the specific 
concerns that opponents of Representative Bliley's bill voiced including data 
bank confidentiality, and the unreliability of medical malpractice payments 
as indicators of physician competence.  Part II will also provide details on 
the reporting process used by the Department of Defense, a process suggested 
by some of the opponents as a potential "fix" for indiscriminate reporting of 
malpractice payment awards.  Part III will focus on some of the problems 
recently identified by the General Accounting Office and by the NPDB in its 
Annual Report for 1999.  The problems include underreporting of clinical 
privileging actions, and use of the "corporate shield," the latter of which 
has resulted in underreporting of potentially thousands of malpractice 
payment reports.  Part III also discusses some of the proposals that have 
been suggested to increase the data bank's reliability, including additional 
sanctioning authority for failures to report adverse hospital privileging 
11
 Public Availability of Physician Information in National  Practitioner Data 
Bank:    Hearing on H.R.   5122 Before the Subcomm.   on Oversight and 
Investigations  of the House Comm.   On  Commerce,   106th Cong. (2000) (statement 
actions.  Finally, Part IV provides a brief overview of suggested 
alternatives to opening the NPDB to the public, specifically, use of state- 
based data banks and the Federation of State Medical Board's (FSMB) new 
"Doclnfo" Internet website, which is a result of the Federation's All 
Licensed Physician's Project (ALPP).12 
I.    THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT AND THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER 
DATA BANK 
A.  History 
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) was enacted on 
November 14, 1986 following Congress' determination that there was a 
"national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from 
State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous 
damaging or incompetent performance." 13 Congress believed that a national 
data bank would help to curtail the potentially harmful effects of such 
nondisclosure and thus authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to establish the National Data Bank.14 The objective of this newly- 
created data bank was to decrease the degree to which unethical or 
incompetent physicians, dentists, and other types of health care 
practitioners could negatively impact the quality of health care in the 
United States.15 
of the Hon. John D. Dingell) at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/legislative.html; Corlin, supra  note 8. 
12
 Corlin, supra  note 8. 
13
 42 U.S.C. § 11101. 
14
 The name, "National Data Bank" was later changed to "National Practitioner 
Data Bank." 
Regulations governing the operation of the National Data Bank 
(hereinafter referred to as the National Practitioner Data Bank or "NPDB") 
were finalized on October 17, 1989.16 In many respects, the NPDB would 
duplicate the kinds of data already collected by State licensing boards and 
other private sector and nonprofit organizations, but at the time of the 
Act's conception, there was concern that States did not have the necessary 
resources to advance the initiatives proposed by the HCQIA and none of the 
data banks in existence had access to the specific kinds of information 
contemplated for collection by the NPDB.  Once operational, the NPDB became 
the only nationally based, central repository for information on physicians 
and other health care practitioners concerning medical malpractice payments 
and certain adverse actions concerning licensure, clinical privileges, and 
professional society memberships.17 
In order to obtain physician information, the NPDB relies on mandatory 
reporting requirements imposed on a variety of entities.  The criteria for 
filing reports with the data bank generally relate to the particular entity's 
15
 HCQIA of October 17, 1989, supra note 3. 
16
 45 C.F.R. Subtitle A Part 60 (2000). 
17
 Id. In addition to professional liability payments, the NPDB collects and 
disseminates the following information in accordance with 45 C.F.R. Subtitle 
A Part 60 (2000) : 
a. Adverse action reports based on professional competence or conduct 
that adversely affects privileges for more than 30 days.  These 
actions include reducing, restricting, suspending, revoking, or 
denying privileges, and include an entity's decision not to renew 
privileges if the decision was based on competence or professional 
misconduct.  It also includes voluntary surrender or restriction of 
privileges either while under investigation or in lieu of an 
investigation; 
b. Disciplinary actions related to competence or professional misconduct 
taken against a license to practice, including revocation, 
suspension, censure, reprimand, probation, and licensure surrender; 
and, 
c. Professional society review actions taken for reasons related to 
competence or professional misconduct that adversely affect 
membership in the professional society. 
area of responsibility.18  For example, insurance companies report 
practitioners for whom medical malpractice payments have been made.19 State 
licensing boards report practitioners who have been disciplined.  Likewise, 
professional .societies are required to report .actions that adversely affect a 
practitioner's membership in the society.  Health care providers, including 
both hospitals and health plans, report restrictions of a practitioner's 
clinical privileges when the restriction is for more than 30 days as well as 
malpractice payments -made -from their -own funds. 
Over the years, the mandatory reporting requirements originally 
established by the HCQIA of 1986 have been substantially expanded.  The 
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, as amended, 
requires states to report JLicens-ure actions taken against .nurses and other 
state-licensed health care practitioners to the NPDB.20 In 1997, an agreement 
between the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector 
General (HHS/OIG), the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), 
and the Health Care-Financing Administration .(HCFA).-, -imposed ^ .requirement 
that practitioners who were excluded from participation in Medicare or 
Medicaid programs due to fraud and abuse activities also would be reported to 
the NPDB.21 Lastly, a Memorandum of Understanding between HHS and the 
Department of j-ustice'-s _adminis.tr a tor of xlie JDrug -Enforcement .Admin i stration 
18
 42 U.S.C. § 11111-33. 
19
 45 C.F.R. § 60.7(a); Jbut see  Am. Dental Assn. v. Donna E. Shalala, 3 F.3d 
445 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(holding the reporting requirement does not include self- 
insured individuals). 
20
 The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. 
L. No. 100-93 § 1(a), 101 Stat. 689 (1987). 
21
 Amendments to OIG Exclusion and CMP Authorities Resulting From Pub. L. 100- 
93, 57 Fed. Reg. 3298 (Jan. 29, 1992). 
(DEA) imposed a requirement on DEA to report actions to revoke or suspend a 
practitioner's registration to dispense controlled substances to the NPDB 22 
Although the problems that the legislation was intended to address were 
not peculiar to the civilian health care sector, the mandatory reporting 
provisions established by the HCQIA were inapplicable to the federal 
government.  To address this gap, section 11152(b) of the Act required HHS to 
enter into Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the Department of Defense 
and the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs.  The intention behind section 
11152(b) was to prevent physicians from circumventing the objective of the 
HCQIA by crossing from federal to private practice (and vice versa) in order 
to avoid detection of reported events.23 Details of the resulting MOU and 
DoD's reporting process appear later in this paper. 
B.  Data Bank Contents and Use 
It is obvious that the types of information contained within the data 
bank could affect a variety of aspects of a practitioner's livelihood, 
including licensure, medical staff positions, future insurability, and 
contractual arrangements (with, for example, HMOs).  Because knowledge of its 
contents carries considerable potential for adverse affects, the statute 
designated the NPDB as a confidential "System of Records" under the Privacy 
Act of 1974 and provided its administrator (HRSA) with penalty authority for 
22
 42 U.S.C. § 11152(c); see also  NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 1999 
ANNUAL REPORT, at 4, available at  http://www.npdg- 
hipdb.org/pointer/npdb.html. 
23
 Act of November 14, 1986, Pub. L. N. 99-660, § 302, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 
Stat.) 6384, 6404-5. 
a variety of infractions.24  For example, authorized queriers (discussed 
infra) who receive information from the NPDB must use it for the purpose for 
which it was intended or subject themselves to a civil monetary penalty of up 
to $10,000 for each violation.25 Criminal penalties, including both fines and 
imprisonment, may be assessed against those who willfully query the NPDB 
under false pretenses or fraudulently gain access to NPDB information. 
Civil penalties of up to $10,000 can also be assessed for each failure to 
report a medical malpractice payment,27 but there are currently no financial 
penalties for states, health care providers, or federal agencies that do not 
report clinical privileging restrictions against practitioners. 
The confidentiality provisions did not interfere with the goal of the 
Act since, from the time of its creation, the NPDB's information was intended 
to supplement other relevant data used by health care providers in the 
decision-making process which accompanies privileging and employment 
decisions.  As such, under current regulations, the data bank's information 
is available only to registered, eligible entities, upon request, with the 
sole purpose of serving as a flagging mechanism for physician competence and 
professional misconduct problems.29 Some entities, including state licensing 
boards, professional societies and other health care entities which conduct 
peer review activities (including HMOs, PPOs, group practices, etc.), may 
make voluntary queries, while others, such as hospitals, must query the NPDB 
whenever a practitioner applies for clinical privileges and every two years 
24
 42 U.S.C. § 11131-37. 
25
 45 C.F.R. § 60.13 (2000) 
26
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(l) (1995). 
27
 45 C.F.R. § 60.7 (2000) . 
28
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-130, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: 
MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK'S RELIABILITY, at 10 
(2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01130.pdf. 
29
 NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
for practitioners already on staff.30  Individual practitioners may conduct 
self-queries, but malpractice insurers, advocacy groups, and the public are 
currently prohibited from querying the data bank for physician specific 
information.31 
As of December 1999, the data bank contained 227,541 reportable 
actions, malpractice payments, and Medicare/Medicaid exclusions, involving 
145,537 individual practitioners.32 Cumulatively, malpractice payments total 
nearly 173,000 or approximately 76% of all reports.33 Reportable actions 
involving licensure, clinical privileges, professional society membership, 
and DEA actions cumulatively represent nearly 19% of all reports received 
since the data bank's inception.34  Standing alone, clinical privilege 
restrictions comprise less than 4% of the data bank's cumulative total.35 The 
remaining 5% of the data bank's reports represent the approximately 13,000 
Medicare/Medicaid exclusions since reporting became mandatory in 1997. 
From September 1990 through December 31, 1999, the NPDB responded to 
over 19.3 million queries with a match rate (a query concerning a 
30
 42 U.S.C. §§ 11135, 11137. 
31
 Members of the public may, however, purchase a public use data file from 
the NPDB.  The public use file contains one complete record for each 
malpractice report or adverse action report in the data bank.  The file is 
devoid of any information which identifies a specific practitioner, but does 
provide the state of residence, licensure, and employment, field of 
licensure, age group, graduation year,  malpractice payment amounts and 
number (single or multiple), number of practitioners included in a payment, 
and whether the payment was the result of a judgment or settlement.  Adverse 
action information includes the classification of the action, as well as the 
length and year of the action. 
32





 Id. . at vii. 
35
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra note 28, at 18. 
36
 NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 
vi. 
practitioner who has one or more reports in the NPDB) of 9.8%.j7  Standing 
alone, the year 1999 resulted in a 12.5% match rate.38 During the five-year 
period of 1995 through the end of 1999, both voluntary and mandatory queries 
increased, but the former has been much greater.39 In light of the structure 
of our health care delivery system, with its burgeoning number of managed 
care organizations, the increase in voluntary queries is not surprising.40 
While the data bank's statistics are impressive, one must still ask 
whether their compilation helps the NPDB in achieving its intended goal:  to 
improve the quality of health care in the United States.  The NPDB Annual 
Report in 1999 stated that licensing authorities and peer reviewers can use 
the practitioner-specific data to make licensing and credentialing decisions 
which has the resultant and general effect of benefiting and protecting the 
public.41 Two additional surveys, one in 1995 and the other in 1997, 
separately found that the majority of entities using the NPDB rated it as an 
important source of information for their peer review activities. 
37
 Id.   at viii. 
38
 Id.     If one extrapolates the data from the NPDB Annual Report for 1999, 
using the lowest fee applicable to a query ($4 for electronic queries; a $3 
surcharge applies for queries submitted on diskettes and self queries are $10 
per data bank search), the cost per match exceeds $32 (3,222,348 queries x 






 Id.   at 3. 
42
 NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: USER SATISFACTION WITH REPORTING AND 
QUERYING AND USEFULNESS OF DISCLOSURE INFORMATION FOR DECISION MAKING 1992 - 
1994 (Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 1995) ; W. E. Neighbor et al, .Rural Hospitals'  Experience 
with  the National  Practitioner Data Bank,   87 Am. J. Pub. Health 663, 663-66 
(1997)(Study involved 149 hospitals, most of which had fewer than 40 beds. 
Forty-eight percent of hospital administrators in the study believed that the 
NPDB made it either somewhat or very much easier to reduce incompetent 
clinical practice at their facility.  The study also found, however, that 
small rural hospitals were more satisfied with the NPDB and found it more 
useful than did larger hospitals.  Only 3.1% of the hospitals in the study 
reported that a report from the NPDB directly affected a decision to deny or 
limit clinical privileges; zero percent of hospitals having 15 or more active 
medical staff indicated that adverse reports from the NPDB were instrumental 
Not everyone, however, is as convinced of the data bank's usefulness. 
On January 31, 1995, in a memo entitled "National Practitioner Data 
Bank/Defense Practitioner Data Bank Status," Lieutenant Colonel David Litts 
of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Health Administration, 
wrote: 
"Since 1990, DoD [Department of Defense] made approximately 
50,000 queries to the NPDB and had a match rate of about 1.5 
percent.  Correcting for redundant matches, this may represent as 
few as 250 bits of information at a cost of $0.25M.  Nationwide 
research by the NPDB has shown that forty percent of the time, 
Data Bank reports contained information already known by the 
querying entity.  More significantly, though, Data Bank reports 
led hospitals to make privileging decisions they would not have 
otherwise made only one percent of the time. .,43 
While the central issue of Lieutenant Colonel Litts' memo was to 
determine realistic uses for and suggest modifications to the Defense 
Practitioner Data Bank (DPDB), his observations concerning the usefulness of 
its companion data bank (at least relative to its expense) are enlightening 
as to the role the NPDB plays in at least one Department's credentials 
in their decision-making process, and overall, 43% of hospital administrators 
in the study believed that the cost exceeded the benefit to them) . 
43
 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel David Litts, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (Jan. 31, 1995) (on file with author). 
According to the NPDB Help Line (1-800-767-6732), query fees are imposed on 
federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, for NPDB queries; fees 
are not imposed on federal agencies for HIPDA queries. 
decisions.  In fact, the Colonel went on to say that "the effectiveness of 
the NPDB in the light of its tremendous cost should be further evaluated."44 
Colonel Litts is not alone in his opinion.  The American Medical 
Association (AMA) would overwhelmingly concur and, in fact, their position 
has long been that the NPDB should be dissolved in its entirety.45 The 
organization used last year's proposal to open the data bank to the public to 
reiterate this position, and at the same time voiced specific concerns 
regarding the data bank's contents and usefulness. 
II.   OPPOSITION TO PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE NPDB 
Even before Representative Bliley had introduced his bill to Congress 
in September 2000, opponents aware of the upcoming proposal began voicing 
their objections.  On March 1, 2000, Rodney Hochman, M.D., Chief Medical 
Officer and Senior Vice President of Sentara Healthcare in Norfolk, Virginia, 
testified before the House Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations on behalf of the American Hospital Association (AHA) .4S During 
his testimony, he described the credentials process used by Sentara Hospitals 
and indicated that Sentara health care facilities queried the NPDB as 
required, but only used the information as a supplement to their own already 
comprehensive process. 
44
 Litts, supra  note 43.  Because the NPDB is self-supporting, query fees 
fluctuate in order to ensure that costs are recovered from user fees. 
According to the NPDB Annual Report for 1999, current fees range from $4-$10 
per practitioner name queried (the latter being the charge for self-query, 
per data bank).  Thus, for those entities subject to mandatory queries, it is 
easy to see how the "cost per match" ratio, discussed supra at note 38, can 
represent a significant amount, particularly if the entity makes very few 
decisions based on the NPDB information provided. 
45
 AMA Board of Trustees Report 31-1-00, supra  note 7, at 9. 
46
 Hochman, supra  note 8. 
According to Dr. Hochman, the AHA's arguments against opening the NPDB 
to the public are twofold, and overlap to a certain degree.  First, public 
disclosure of the data bank's contents would undermine the confidentiality of 
the peer review process used to flesh out reports of medical errors which 
would ultimately impede the goal of promoting quality health care.4 
Secondly, the data bank, as currently configured, was not designed to be a 
consumer tool specifically because the bulk of its contents (malpractice 
payment reports) are prone to misinterpretation.48 As the following 
discussion indicates, these concerns are, at least in part, meritorious. 
A.  Confidentiality of NPDB Contents 
At the time the HCQIA was drafted in 1986, the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce (now the Commerce Committee) emphasized that Congress did 
not design the NPDB to disseminate information to the public at large.49  In 
discussing malpractice settlement data, for example, the Committee stated 
that "it is essential to collect and disseminate these data to  those in  the 
health  care community who make judgments about the competence and 
professional conduct of health care practitioners [emphasis added]."50 The 
report went on to say that the Committee was "confident that those authorized 
under this bill to gain access  to this information will have  the awareness 











Clearly, the Committee recognized the difficulty that might ensue if a 
consumer attempted to interpret the data bank's physician-specific data in 
its raw form.  As a result, information contained within the NPDB permitting 
identification of any particular practitioner, entity, or patient was made 
confidential when HHS designated the NPDB as a confidential system of 
records.52 The principle of confidentiality has thus governed the operation 
i     53 
of the NPDB since its inception and has been integral to its operation. 
The AHA promoted a second, related argument concerning confidentiality 
of data bank information and its effect on the relationship between quality 
of care and the peer review process used by health care providers.  Although 
privileges and immunities have traditionally been a matter of state law, one 
of the basic initiatives of the HCQIA was the use of peer review to weed out 
bad physicians and other incompetent health care providers.  In order to 
achieve that goal, the Act included provisions designed to encourage 
effective use of peer review by extending confidentiality to the peer review 
members' work product and immunity from private damages so long as peer 
review actions are conducted in good faith and in accordance with established 
standards.54 The Act's implementing regulations also provided the necessary 
incentives to comply — failure to do so could result in an entity losing its 
immunity for up to three years.55 
52
 42 U.S.C. § 11137. 
53
 In a February 24, 2000 letter to the Chairman of the House Commerce 
Committee, HHS wrote, "The information collected in the data bank was never 
intended to serve as a complete history but rather as an important supplement 
to comprehensive and careful professional peer review of a practitioner's 
credentials.  As a result, the statute puts in place confidentiality 
protections that create a strong expectation of privacy among the hundreds of 
hospital entities and insurance companies required to make regular and 
detailed submissions to the data bank." 
54
 42 U.S.C. § 11111. 
55
 45 C.F.R. § 60.9(c) (2000) . 
According to the AHA, opening the data bank would create significantly 
more tension among the various participants than already exists regarding 
reportable events.  Allowing public access to adverse credentialing actions 
in the data bank would result in health care providers being less candid in 
revealing their own mistakes and those of their peers during the peer review 
process.56 Ultimately, mistakes would be forced underground, thereby 
eliminating the opportunity to analyze them, how they occurred, and how to 
prevent them in the future.  If the data bank's contents were publicly 
accessible, the real losers, say the AHA, would be the very same patients who 
are the intended beneficiaries of medically-related quality assurance 
efforts. 
B.  Medical Malpractice Payment Reports 
Opponents to opening the data bank made an equally compelling argument 
in support of their position based on the specific contents of the NPDB.  As 
was previously noted, nearly 80% of the NPDB's entries reflect malpractice 
payments made on behalf of health care practitioners.57  Both the AMA and AHA 
claim that the typical consumer would be misled by the type of raw 
malpractice claims data contained in the NPDB.  For example, there is no 
minimum threshold for reporting the amounts paid on malpractice claims, so 
even diminimus payments must be reported.58  Furthermore, some states, though 
56
 Hochman, supra  note 8. 
57
 Oddly, despite the high percentage of malpractice payment reports already 
made to the data bank, the number would likely be far higher if the corporate 
shield loophole, discussed infra  at 33, was fixed. 
58
 HRSA did not break medical malpractice payment reports down by actual 
dollar amounts in the NPDB Annual Report for 1999, making it difficult to 
pinpoint the number of "diminimus" reports actually submitted.  According to 
Table 12 of the report, there were 15,142 payments reported in 1999 with a 
mean payment of $226,739 and a median payment of $108,675.  These figures are 
fairly consistent with the cumulative totals.  Adjusted for inflation, the 
not all, limit the amount of malpractice awards, which means that payment 
reports from different states can vary widely even though they result from 
the same general type of claim. 
The confusion surrounding interpretation of medical malpractice payment 
reports is compounded by the fact that the data bank does not differentiate 
between payments made in situations involving substandard care and those 
settled for what might be considered sound business reasons.  The 
aggressiveness of the attorneys or the quality of evidence, such as medical 
records, may dictate that the best course of action is to settle the case, 
59 
even though, in most circumstances, the payment is a reportable action. 
Likewise, payments made for the purpose of eliminating defense of frivolous 
or non-meritorious claims or in order to minimize the costs of litigation 
must also be reported to the NPDB.  In fact, many insurers disallow and some 
state laws prohibit "consent to settle" clauses, thus allowing the insurer to 
entirely disregard a practitioner's desire to defend himself or herself on 
the merits.60 
NPDB has a cumulative total of 133,505 payments, with an adjusted mean 
payment of $213,335 and an adjusted median payment of $100,000.  Segregated 
out by categories, the lowest payment means and medians fell under "equipment 
or product related" and "miscellaneous." The remaining categories included 
monitoring, treatment, obstetrics, intravenous and blood products, 
medication, surgery, anesthesia, and diagnosis.  Of. Richard L. Granville, 
M.D. & Robert E. Oshel, The National  Practitioner Data Bank   (NPDB)   Public Use 
File:     A Valuable Resource for Quality Assurance Personnel  and Risk Managers, 
Legal Med. 1998:1-6, 4 (indicating that between 1990-96, the NPDB had reports 
of 24,843 payments falling between $0-10,000 representing 21% of all payments 
reported and 36% of all reported payments were $25,000 or less.  During the 
same timeframe, only 6% off all payments were over $500,000).  Legal Medicine 
is an annual publication put out by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 
Department of Legal Medicine.  Articles from the journal may be found at 
http://www.afip.org/departments/legalmed/lmof.html. 
59
 Payments made out of a physician's own funds, or where a physician 
initially named in the claim has been removed from the settlement agreement 
are not reported to the data bank. 
60
 Corlin, supra  note 8. 
Given all of these factors, a legitimate argument exists that without 
some type of contextual explanation, raw numbers of malpractice payment 
reports like those contained in the NPDB would be unhelpful, and perhaps even 
harmful, to the public.  During an interview on the evening news program, 
"Nightline," Richard Corlin, M.D., then President-Elect of the AMA, stated 
that consumers have a right to what he called "properly expressed" 
malpractice information.61 If given only numbers and amounts of malpractice 
payments made on behalf of a practitioner, the average consumer might 
conclude that the numbers are an effective barometer of physician competence 
and decide against using what might be a very well-qualified doctor. 
The use of explanatory provisions to put physician-specific information 
in context was a common theme throughout the debate on public accessibility 
to the NPDB.  Consumers should know, for example, that certain specialties 
are prone to greater risk than others and that those who deal with high-risk 
patients or perform state-of-the-art procedures are far more likely to 
attract litigation just by the very nature of their practice.62 Likewise, the 
longer a physician is in practice, the greater the likelihood that he will 
have been exposed to a malpractice claim.63 
Those who oppose public access to the NPDB insist that the data bank 
must control for such contextual variations before it can be useful as a 
consumer tool.  Interestingly, Representative Bliley's proposal, which was 
modeled after the State of Massachusetts' publicly-accessible data bank,64 
61
 Nightline   (ABC television broadcast, (Sep. 20, 2000) (transcript on file 
with author). 
62
 Dingell, supra  note 11. For example, obstetrics and neurosurgery generally 




 Massachusetts' Physician's Profiles Program can be accessed through a toll 
free call, 1-800-377-0550, or via their web site, http://massmedboard.org 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2001). 
called for the very kind of contextual information that opponents of the bill 
said was needed.  For example, the bill required: 
comparisons between the physician involved and the experiences and 
payments made on behalf of other physicians in the same specialty; 65 
disclosure of whether the amount paid was in settlement, or partial 
settlement of or in satisfaction of a judgment in a medical 
malpractice action or claim;66 
a statement that payment made pursuant to a malpractice claim may be 
made for a variety of reasons and that physicians who work with 
high-risk patients may have higher numbers of medical malpractice 
claims against them;67 and, 
a statement that malpractice histories differ by specialty and as a 
result of variances in state law and the data bank's information 
compares physicians based on those factors. 
Finally, Representative Bliley's proposal required a statement that a 
payment should not be construed as creating a presumption that medical 
malpractice occurred and is not necessarily reflective of a practitioner's 
competence. 
65
 H.R.   5122     §  428(e)(1)(A)    (2000) 
66
 Id.   §  428(e)(1)(B)(ii). 
67
 Id.   §  428(e) (4) . 
68
 Id.   § 428(e) (5)   and   (6) . 
69
 Id.   § 428(e) (2)   and   (3) . 
Credible data supports the theory that there is a weak correlation 
between medical malpractice claims/payments and negligence.  In 1991, a group 
of researchers published the results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study in 
the New England Journal of Medicine.70 The study centered on adverse events 
involving more than 30,000 randomly selected discharges from 51 randomly 
selected New York hospitals during 1984.71 The findings of the study, which 
were later corroborated by a study of adverse events in Colorado and Utah in 
1992,72 indicated that medical malpractice claims are rarely made after 
patients are injured negligently and, conversely, that claims are relatively 
frequent even in the absence of negligent injury.73 
Because the researchers involved in the Harvard Medical Practice Study 
lacked information on the eventual outcome of the cases studied, they were 
unable to evaluate the overall ability of medical malpractice litigation to 
make accurate determinations and decided to conduct a 10 year follow-up of 
the malpractice claims identified in the original study.74  For definitional 
purposes, "accurate determinations" meant that only meritorious claims 
resulted in compensation and that non-meritorious claims resulted in no 
compensation.75  In the 51 litigated claims identified for follow-up, they 
discovered that the severity of the patient's disability, not the occurrence 
of an adverse event or an adverse event due to negligence, was predictive of 
70
 A. R. Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse 
Events due  to Negligence:     Results  of the Harvard Medical  Practice Study III. 
325 N. Eng. J. Med 245, 245-251 (Jul. 25, 1991). 
71
 Id.;   "adverse event" is defined as an injury caused by medical management 
rather than by the underlying disease or condition of the patient.  Some 
adverse events are attributable to errors, others to negligence. 
72
 Eric J. Thomas, M.D. et al., Incidence and Types  of Adverse Events and 
Negligent Care in  Utah and Colorado.     38 Med Care 261, 261-271 (Spring, 
2000).  Adverse events due to negligence was 27.6% and 29.2% in the New York 
and Colorado/Utah studies, respectively. 
73
 Localio, supra  note 70. 
74
 Troyen A. Brennan et. al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and 
the Outcomes  of Medical-Malpractice Litigation,   335 New Eng. J. Med. 1963, 
1963-67 (Dec. 26, 1996). 
the payment to a patient.76 Researchers admitted that the follow-up study had 
limitations which prevented them from providing generalized insight, but 
nevertheless concluded that the results suggested that the standard of 
medical negligence does not correlate well to malpractice litigation, further 
bolstering the arguments against opening medical malpractice payment 
information to the public.77 
Similarly, in 1994, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology published 
the results of its study into the relationship of malpractice payments to the 
occurrence of substandard care using the DoD's database of closed malpractice 
claims in an attempt to show the effect that reporting thresholds might have 
on the NPDB.78 The study, which will be more fully discussed in the next 
section, concluded that malpractice claim payments and payment amounts 
correlated poorly with standard of care determinations and that the 
"fairness" of reporting payments does not significantly improve by imposing 
arbitrary reporting thresholds.79 
75
 Id.   at 1963. 
76
 Id.     Among the 51 cases, 10 of 24 originally identified as having no 
adverse event settled for the plaintiffs with a mean payment of $28,760.  Six 
of 13 involving adverse events but no negligence settled for the plaintiffs 
with a mean payment of $98,192, and in 5 of 9 cases in which adverse events 
due to negligence were found, the settlement mean was $66,944.  Seven of 
eight claims involving permanent disability were settled with a mean payment 
of $201,250. 
77
 Id.   at 1967.  The limitations identified were that the study had a 
relatively small number of cases and those cases only reflected litigation 
practices in New York. 
78
 Richard L. Granville, M.D., & Stephen V. Mawn, Commander, Medical Corps, 
U.S. Naval Reserve, A Threshold Question:     How do Payment Amounts in Medical 
Malpractice Claims Relate  to  the Medical  Care Rendered?,   1994:1-6. 
C.  Using the Department of Defense Model as an Alternative Medical 
Malpractice Reporting Process 
The reporting process used by the Department of Defense (DoD) has both 
been applauded by the AMA as a method which recognizes the problem with 
trying to correlate lawsuits with physician competence or negligence and 
criticized by HRSA as a variant of the corporate shield (discussed infra). 
As earlier stated, the mandatory reporting provisions of the HCQIA were 
inapplicable to the federal government, but the Act required HHS to enter 
into memoranda of understanding (MOU) with certain federal agencies so as not 
to create incentives for physicians identified under the program to move 
81 
undetected from the federal to the civilian sector or vice versa. 
On September 21, 1987, the Departments of Defense and Health and Human 
82 Services entered into a MOU in accordance with the directive of the HCQIA. 
The MOU outlines reporting requirements for professional sanctions (clinical 
privileging actions) and practitioner misconduct which are similar to their 
civilian counterparts' reporting requirements, but the provision pertaining 
to malpractice reports requires a peer review process unavailable in the 
civilian sector.  According to DoD policy, "...all malpractice claims shall be 
analyzed by peer review, assigned a category of responsibility, and reported 
as follows..."83 The three enumerated categories are: 
79
 Id.   at 5. 
80
 NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 
18; Corlin, supra  note 8; see also  AMA Board of Trustees Report, supra  note 
7, at 4 (indicating that DoD representatives told the AMA that the 
correlation of settled claims and actual negligence is about 30%). 
81
 Act of November 14, 1986, Pub. L. N. 99-660, § 302, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 




 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Department of Defense, Sept. 21, 1987. 
o Standard medical care. Payments made for claims in which the patient 
was found to have received appropriate care shall be reported under the 
name of the primary physician. 
o Minor deviation from standards of care.  When payments are made for 
claims in which the patient was found to have received care that was 
substandard in minor respects, a separate report shall be submitted for 
each practitioner found to have provided substandard care. 
o Major deviation from standards of care.  When payments are made for 
claims in which the patient was found to have received care that was 
substandard in major respects, a separate report shall be submitted for 
each practitioner found to have provided substandard care. 
The DoD's participation in the NPDB was officially implemented through 
publication of a directive on November 1, 1990 and was subsequently published 
in the Federal Register on December 6, 1990.85 Among other things, the 
regulation states that DoD policy requires quality assurance review in every 
case involving a potential instance of malpractice by a DoD practitioner and 
makes the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) responsible for 




 Department of Defense Participation in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 
55 Fed. Reg. 50,321 (Dec. 6, 1990) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 221). 
Department of Defense implementing regulations are found in DoD Directive 
6025.14, "Department of Defense Participation in the National Practitioner 
Data Bank (NPDB)," Nov. 1, 1990. 
86
 Id.     Citations to some of the DoD directives and instructions appear at 
footnotes 80 and 83.  Often, these directives further delegate responsibility 
within each military service to, for example, the Secretary of the Navy (see 
infra  footnote 132),, who further delegates to the Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery (BUMED).  Pertinent instructions concerning the implementation of and 
process for reporting within the United States Navy include BUMED Instruction 
6010.18, "Participation in the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)," May 
Finally, it charged the various Secretaries of the Military Departments with 
87 implementation of the regulatory requirements. 
Within the DoD, the statute of limitations requires that a claimant, or 
his attorney, file a claim within two years of the act giving rise to the 
action with the local office of the Staff Judge Advocate.  The claim is 
forwarded to the cognizant military claims service office as necessary (Navy, 
Air Force, or Army) for initial action.  The claims office has six months 
during which to settle or deny the claim.  If the claim is denied, the 
claimant may file suit in U.S. District Court and any case thus filed will be 
managed by a U.S. Attorney from the Department of Justice (DOJ).88 
All medical malpractice payments within the DoD are presumed to be made 
for the benefit of a healthcare practitioner.89 This presumption is 
conclusive 180 days after the Surgeon General of the military department 
involved (i.e., Navy, Army, or Air Force) receives notice of the payment 
unless, prior to that date, the Surgeon General makes a final determination 
that the malpractice payment was not caused by the failure of any 
practitioner(s) significantly involved to meet the standard of care.90 
18, 1993 and BUMED Instruction 6320.67A, "Adverse Privileging Actions, Peer 




 Within the Department of the Navy, the settlement limitations are $50,000 
and $200,000 for the Commanding Officer, Naval Legal Service Office (the 
"claims" office) and the Judge Advocate General Headquarters, Civil Law 
Division (Claims, Investigations, & Tort Litigation), respectively. 
89
 DoD Instruction 6025.15, "Implementation of Department of Defense 
Participation in the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)," Oct. 12, 2000. 
Based on this clear language and the process used for reporting DoD 
practitioners, one can assume that in those cases where negligence is clearly 
due to circumstances not attributable to the practitioner, as in the case of 
faulty equipment, for example, the final determination can be reached far 
more quickly than it otherwise might. 
90
 Id. 
The process followed by the Surgeon General in making a final 
determination is fairly complex.  Based on the results of the initial quality 
assurance review, the Surgeon General makes a preliminary determination on 
whether the malpractice payment was or was not caused by the failure of one 
or more practitioners to meet the standard of care.  If his determination is 
that the payment was not caused by a failure to meet the standard of care, 
the entire case file is forwarded for external peer review.91 The external 
peer reviewer provides the Surgeon General with an opinion as to whether or 
not the standard of care was met for each involved provider.92 
The Surgeon General makes his final determination following receipt of 
the external peer review opinion.  If the final determination is that the 
malpractice payment was not caused by failure to meet the standard of care, 
the presumption (that malpractice payments are made for the benefit of a 
healthcare practitioner in all cases) is overcome and no report is made to 
the NPDB.93  If the converse is found or the 180 day period runs before the 
Surgeon General has made his final determination, a report is made in the 
name of any and all significantly involved practitioners.94 Although this 
report can later be amended by the Surgeon General's office if the entry was 
due to a lapse of the 180 day clock, it may not be removed from the NPDB, 
even if the eventual determination is that the standard of care was not 
breached.95 
91
 Id.     Such external review will also take place in those situations where a 
system problem is identified rather than failure to meet the standard of 
care. 
92
 Id.     External peer reviews are designated confidential quality assurance 







It should be noted, however, that there are many payments made under 
various military compensation programs that result from medical care rendered 
but which are not malpractice payments under NPDB rules.  The Supreme Court 
decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) provided that because 
of the unique nature of military service, military members killed or injured 
incident to military service must rely on the military disability system and 
other military compensation programs as their exclusive remedies.  Thus, 
Federal court jurisdiction is not available under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
for those injured "incident to service."  Recognizing the reporting 
discrepancies this might cause,96 the DoD requires that such cases be reviewed 
using a process similar to that used for NPDB reporting.  If the final 
determination is that a report should be made, the reporting information is 
forwarded to the Defense Practitioner Data Bank (DPDB), a separate DoD 
database maintained by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Department of 
Legal Medicine.97 
"Tort-2," a part of the DPDB, is a risk management database which 
contains entries on all closed DoD malpractice claims since 1988, both paid 
and unpaid.98 Obviously then, with regard to DoD malpractice claims, Tort-2 
is far more inclusive in its entries than the NPDB.  As of mid-1998, Tort-2 
had 4,164 entries (as compared to a total of 4,580 in the DPDB), 1,661 of 
96
 See infra,   note 97 and accompanying text.  For example, the annual number 
of DoD malpractice claims filed is approximately 1,000 or 7 to 9 claims per 
100 physicians.  The annual rate of claims filed per 100 civilian sector 
physicians is approximately 12 to 16.  Given that DoD has an active duty 
patient population of approximately 20%, without the application of the Feres 
Doctrine, the DoD annual rate of claims would no doubt increase. 
97
 DoD Instruction 6025.15, supra  note 89.  The Defense Practitioner Data Bank 
(DPDB) is a software program used since 1982 and modified twice (1988 and 
1990) to track malpractice claims and adverse privileging actions throughout 
DoD. 
98
 Richard L. Granville, M.D. et al, Characteristics  of Department  of Defense 
Medical Malpractice Claims:    A Quality Management  Tool,   1999:1-8, 1.  A claim 
is considered "closed" when final legal action has been taken. 
which had been paid." Available statistics indicate that the Surgeon General 
determined that the standard of care had been met in 68.9% of Tort-2 cases, 
had not been met in 25.5% of cases, and another 5.6% were undetermined.100 Of 
the paid cases in the DPDB, 18.3% of the cases resulted in payments of 
$10,000 or less and a total of over 40% resulted in payments of under 
$25,000.101 At the other end of the spectrum, nearly 10% of claims paid 
resulted in payments in excess of $500,000.102 
Recently, HRSA officials expressed concerns about the limited quantity 
and timeliness of reports they receive following DoD peer review processes 
leading one to believe that HHS is skeptical about the efficacy and 
efficiency of the process.103 On the other hand, HRSA is  entertaining a 
proposal that would permit peer review organizations to determine which 
practitioners involved in malpractice settlements should be reported to NPDB, 
thereby lending a certain validity to the process used by DoD and the notion 
that it presents more accurate reporting results.' 
The "fairness" of the DoD's reporting process has not been a specific 
focus of scholarly articles, however, in 1994, the Armed Forces Institute of 
Pathology (AFIP) published an article which explored the effect that 
reporting thresholds might have on the NPDB.104 The study, based on Tort-2 
statistics, was unique in that each case within the database had already been 
subject to several levels of scrutiny in order to determine whether the 




 Id.   at 5.  An indeterminate evaluation is generally the result of 
inadequate medical records for review. 
101





 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra note 28, at 12. 
104
 Granville, supra  note 78. 
the standard of care determinations (remember, this database contains all 
closed DoD malpractice claims, not just those reported to the NPDB), paid and 
unpaid cases, and, in the case of the former, amounts paid.105  He then imposed 
arbitrary reporting thresholds of $25,000, $30,000, and $50,000 and concluded 
that although such thresholds would prevent many cases in which the standard 
of care was met from being reported to the NPDB, it would also dramatically 
decrease the number of reports of cases arising from substandard care. 
Thus, the author concluded that the "fairness" of reporting payments was not 
significantly improved by using payment thresholds. 107 
More importantly, the AFIP article provided a useful comparison of 
Tort-2 cases based on standard of care determinations and payment status from 
which one can make certain assumptions regarding the fairness of the DoD 
reporting process.  As of 1994, when the article was written, the Tort-2 
database contained 1,750 cases in which senior reviewers had already made 
standard of care determinations.108  Of the 713 cases resulting in payment, the 
standard of care had been met in 55% of them.109  Of the 1,037 unpaid cases, 
the standard of care was met in over 83% of the case, but was not met in 16% 
of them.110 
In the civilian sector, all 713 paid cases would have been reported to 




 Id.   at 3.  For example, using DoD statistics, the author found that with a 
$50,000 threshold, nearly 4 out of 10 paid cases represented situations where 
reviewers had determined that the standard of care had been met.  Conversely, 
he found that over 63% of cases in which the standard of care was not met 
would go unreported at the $50,000 threshold. 
107
 Id.   at 5. 
108
 Id. at 2. Tort-2 contained 1,932 cases at the time, but standard of care 
determinations were "indeterminate" in nearly 200 of them resulting in their 





within the DoD.  In other words, were it not for the DoD process, another 392 
DoD cases would have been reported to the NPDB despite the standard of care 
having been met.  On the other hand, the actual number of unpaid cases 
involving substandard care seems quite low, given the fact that, as the 
author noted, the 16% includes cases in which there was no compensable 
injury, cases in which the substandard care was not the cause of the 
claimant's injury, and those involving procedural flaws, such as statute of 
limitations issues.111 
III.  ADDITIONAL DEFICIENCIES PLAGUE THE NPDB 
A.  The GAO Report:  Inaccurate, Incomplete, and Untimely 
In November 2000, the General Accounting Office's (GAO) Letter Report 
entitled, "National Practitioner Data Bank:  Major Improvements Are Needed to 
Enhance Data Bank's Reliability," delivered a major blow to those in support 
of allowing public access to the data bank.112   Two of the three areas 
reviewed by the GAO are pertinent to this report:  (1) evaluation of the 
accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of reported data; and (2) assessment 
of HRSA's efforts to address underreporting.113 
After interviewing representatives of HRSA, HHS/OIG, and various other 
health care industry organizations, and reviewing HRSA's operational and 
research plans, studies, and other documentation (including reports submitted 




 See  generally  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-01-130, supra note 28. 
113
 Id.     The third problem identified in the GAO report concerned assessment of 
internal controls over user fees and expenditures. 
information may not be as accurate, complete, or as timely as it should be. 
Inaccuracies in the way reported information was coded could confuse or 
mislead querying organizations about the severity of actions taken against 
practitioners."114  The true significance of this statement lies not so much in 
what was said as what was not - - that if querying organizations with 
guidebooks115 to lead them through the reports could be confused by them, what 
real chance does the average consumer have of making sense of the data bank's 
contents? 
The GAO outlined some of the major contributing factors to the NPDB's 
failures regarding accuracy, completeness, and timeliness.  Not only did the 
reviewers discover that duplicate reports overstate and may in fact double 
the amount of information the NPDB has on any particular practitioner, but 
they also found that the processes established for correcting erroneous 
submissions and/or duplications have failed.116 They noted inaccuracies in all 
three of the types of reports under review.  In general, medical malpractice 
reports were incomplete with over 95% of them failing to indicate what role 
the standard of care played in making a settlement or award determination.11 
Approximately one-third of adverse clinical privileges reports reviewed were 
inaccurate,118 and eleven percent of state licensure actions contained 
misleading or inaccurate information on the level of discipline given or the 
actual number of times a practitioner was subjected to discipline.1 
114
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra  note 28, at summary. 
115
 See  generally  Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and 
Services Administration, National  Practitioner Data Bank Guidebook   (May 
1996).  An updated Guidebook, scheduled for completion in the Fall 2000, was 
unavailable at the time of this writing. 
116
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra  note 28, at summary. 
The two methods for correcting erroneous reports are practitioner 
notification and dispute resolution. 
117





The GAO' s detailed dissection of sample reports provided further 
illumination of the specific deficiencies noted during the review.  For the 
sample month of September 1999, 250 out of 1,300 malpractice reports were 
reviewed and only 1 out of those 250 met NPDB reporting requirements.120 While 
some of the requirements are descriptive of the patient, others relate to the 
quality of practitioner performance — the very type of information which 
helps queriers identify performance problems.  Of the 5% of malpractice 
reports whose narrative section indicated that standard of care had been 
considered, only one report noted the actual determination. 
Data bank licensure reports and clinical privilege restriction reports 
were likewise flawed.  Twenty-four of the 252 licensure reports submitted 
during September 1999 contained inaccurate characterization of actions and 
considerable variation in the amount and type of narrative information 
provided.122  The lack of narrative information further frustrated the 
reviewers as they tried to discern whether seemingly duplicate reports were, 
in fact, just that.123  Similar to the findings regarding licensure reports, 
mischaracterization of actions taken made up the bulk of inaccuracies for 
clinical privilege restriction reports, though the GAO report indicated that 
overall, the latter's narrative sections proved of far greater help than 
those in the licensure reports.124 
120
 Id.   at 20. 
121
 Id.   at 21. 
122
 Id.   at 22.  According to the report, this may be due in part to HRSA's lack 
of established criteria for information which should be included in the 
narrative sections of both clinical privilege restriction reports and 
licensure reports. 
123
 For example, some practitioners were reported for licensure actions twice 
during the month of September 1999.  Without adequate narratives, the 
reviewers could not tell if the licensure action was reported twice for the 
same event. 
124
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra  note 28, at 24. 
HRSA responded to the GAO's concern regarding inaccuracies by stating 
that only in cases of obvious error do staffers request corrected reports and 
that contract staff charged with inputting data bank information are not 
authorized to make any changes to submissions.125 Although HHS concurred with 
a GAO recommendation to improve compliance monitoring and enforcement and to 
develop criteria for descriptive information to be included in disciplinary 
action reports, the Department did not concur with a specific recommendation 
aimed at improving the reliability of reported information.1 
B.  NPDB Annual Report 1999 
Although the GAO report provides a more recent outline of some of the 
factors contributing to the NPDB's unreliability, it would be misleading to 
presume that the data bank's administrators did not already recognize some of 
its own problems.  Each year the data bank publishes an annual report which 
highlights a variety of areas pertinent to its operation.  The report 
contains statistical data (both annual and comprehensive), the status of 
current projects, the results of ongoing and completed projects, and 
information concerning problems and the proposals which have been or are 
being considered to remedy those problems. 
Two of the problems discussed in the National Practitioner Data Bank's 
Annual Report for 1999 (the most recent report available at the time of this 
writing) directly relate to the debate which followed Representative Bliley's 
proposal to make the data bank accessible to the public.  Both concern 
125
 Id.   at 21. 
126
 Id.   at 6.  Specifically, GAO recommended that HRSA develop procedures to 
routinely check the accuracy and completeness of information, to obtain 
underreporting; the first is of medical malpractice payments due to use of 
the "corporate shield" (which may seem surprising given that such payments 
make up the bulk of the data bank's contents), and the second concerns 
clinical privileging actions. 
2. The Corporate Shield Loophole 
Despite the high percentage of entries for malpractice payment reports, 
there is a loophole within the NPDB's implementing regulations that could 
represent a significant amount of underreporting  of malpractice payments. 
Under current regulations, a licensed practitioner must be named in two 
documents in order to trigger the NPDB's reporting requirement:  (1) a 
written complaint or claim, and (2) the release of the claim.127  Corporate 
entities, such as hospitals and professional corporations, are not reported. 
The situations under scrutiny are those in which plaintiffs in malpractice 
actions dismiss an individual defendant just prior to settlement, and leave 
or substitute a nonreportable entity, such as a hospital or professional 
corporation.128  This practice is known as using the "corporate shield." 
HRSA officials have not been able to quantify the extent to which the 
loophole is used for this purpose, but assert that it compromises the 
usefulness of the NPDB as a flagging system when a practitioner who has 
corrections from reporters when necessary, user and practitioner 
notifications procedures. 
127
 45 C.F.R. § 60.7 (2000) . 
123
 McDermott, Will, & Emery, National  Practitioner Data Bank Proposes 
Controversial  Expansion  of Reporting Requirements,   16 Health Law Update 5, 
(Apr. 13, 1999), at  http://www.mwe.com/news/hlul605.htm.  In the article, the 
AHA reportedly stated that statistics from one of its state hospital 
association members indicated that in 1997, approximately 97% of malpractice 
lawsuits settled prior to trial with no admission of wrongdoing by any party 
and without the names of any licensed practitioners. 
committed malpractice is able to avoid being reported in this way.129  In an 
effort to close the loophole, in December 1998 HHS introduced a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking.130  In the preamble to the proposal, HRSA stated that the 
payer, during the course of its review of the claim, would be required to 
identify any practitioner whose professional conduct was at issue. 
Specifically, the change would have required any entity making a payment to 
name the practitioner(s) regardless of whether he or she was actually named 
in the original claim or the release if, in the payer's opinion the 
practitioner(s) contributed to the alleged malpractice.132 
Not surprisingly, the proposal met with swift opposition from the 
health care field, including the AHA, AMA, and the American Insurance 
Association. In a somewhat revealing statement as to the possible extent to 
which the corporate shield is used, a representative of the AMA commented, 
"It is not the government's duty to second guess the plaintiff who has the 
benefit of the discovery process...in finding potentially culpable parties." 
They also argued, and the American Insurance Association (AIA) agreed, that 
the change would increase litigation (since practitioners would likely 
contest any settlement attempts) resulting in even higher malpractice 
coverage costs for practitioners.  The insurance industry further argued that 
the requirement would interfere with settlement negotiations, placing 
malpractice insurers in the role of investigator, judge, and jury in 
malpractice claims.  According to the AIA, the insurer would be unprotected 
if he reported improperly, and practitioners would be denied due process in 
129
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 McDermott, supra  note 128. 
those cases where they are initially named in a lawsuit, but later found not 
liable by the court.134 
In response to the volumes of comments opposing the changes, HRSA 
withdrew the proposal, but indicated that the Department would continue to 
explore other methods to resolve the underreporting which the corporate 
shield loophole permits.135  HRSA has been working closely with the NPDB 
Executive Committee, which opposed the proposed changes, in an effort to come 
up with a proposal reasonable to all concerned. 136  Full support of this 
powerful Committee is essential if HHS hopes to make any change to medical 
malpractice reporting requirements. 
2.     Underreporting of Hospital Privileging Actions 
Hospital credentialing committees and malpractice litigation have long 
been two of the major quality assurance measures in health care.  Over the 
past two and a half decades, the latter has been the more influential of the 
two.137  This influence seems to have had a tendency to degrade, rather than 
improve, the quality of care. 
134
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra  note 28, at n. 
135
 Id.     In a telephone interview with Mark Pinchus, HRSA, Quality Assurance 
Division (Apr. 17, 2001), Mr. Pinchus stated that his division continues to 
work with industry representatives and that they are considering "a 
regulatory approach" to resolving the problem.  Because such an approach 
would require Congressional action, the recent change in administration has, 
at least for the time being, stymied progress.  Mr. Pinchus also stated that 
he is unaware of any plan by a Congressional representative to introduce such 
regulatory measures during the current session. 
136
 The Committee has been in existence since 1988 and its membership includes 
health care representatives from accrediting bodies, licensing boards, 
hospitals and other health care providers, malpractice insurers, and 
professional societies. 
137
 Troyen A. Brennan, Hospital  Peer Review and Clinical  Privileges Actions: 
To Report  or Not Report,   282 JAMA 384 (Jul. 28, 1999). 
In a mid-year broadcast of Nightline, then AMA President-elect Richard 
Corlin, stated, "The American Medical Association is very concerned that the 
public be able to get access to data concerning licensing problems, 
disciplining,   and valid malpractice information on any physician that they're 
going to [sic][emphasis added]."138 The recent GAO report also addressed this 
issue, stating that health care industry representatives agree that 
disciplinary actions taken by health care providers and states are better 
indicators of professional competence than malpractice reports.1 
Nevertheless, because restriction or loss of a physician's hospital 
privileges is such a serious action, hospitals will generally only suspend 
those privileges as a last resort.  In a 1994 study of 149 rural hospitals, 
the most frequently reported changes to hospital quality assurance activities 
since the NPDB began collecting data concerned increased usage of 
alternatives to restricting clinical privileges.140  More and more, hospitals 
and other healthcare entities opt for less onerous, non-reportable actions 
such as professional supervision, additional medical education, and short- 
term privilege restrictions.141   Thus, the very immunity that the HCQIA of 
1986 provided to peer review activities in order to bolster self-regulation 
may in fact have a negative effect on improving the quality of care, the 
legislated purpose of the NPDB. 
138
 Nightline,   supra  note 61. 
139
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra  note 28, at 4. 
140
 Neighbor, supra  note 42, at 665.  Thirteen percent of the study hospitals 
reported increases in monitoring professional activities without restricting 
clinical privileges, 12% reported increases in the use of continuing medical 
education without restricting clinical privileges, 7% reported increases in 
having physicians resign or voluntarily surrender clinical privileges, and 5^ 
reported increases in imposing disciplinary periods shorter than 31 days. 
141
 Brennan, supra  note 137, at 385.  Short-term refers to periods of 30 days 
or less. 
The actual number of reports of disciplinary actions taken by health 
care providers have led to serious concerns of underreporting of such 
actions.  Despite pre-operational predictions ranging from 5,000 (Public 
Health Service) to 10,000 (AMA) clinical privileging reports annually, the 
NPDB had received a total of fewer than 9,000 after nine years of operation.14 
As of December 31, 1999, 59.5% of non-Federal hospitals registered with the 
NPDB and in an active status had never reported a clinical privileges action 
to the NPDB.143 Asked by HRSA management in 1995 to study the perceived 
underreporting of clinical privilege restrictions, the Department of Health 
and Human Services' Office of Inspector General (HHS/OIG) found that 
approximately 75% of all hospitals had not reported a single privileging 
action to the NPDB during the three year period studied.  HHS/OIG concluded 
that the issue demanded further attention by HRSA, and suggested that HRSA 
refocus the energy it was expending on underreporting of malpractice payments 
to underreporting of clinical privileges actions 144 
In addition to the HHS/OIG study, a second study of 4,743 short-term, 
nonfederal, general medical/surgical hospitals throughout the United States 
between 1991 and 1995 concluded that there is a low and declining level of 
hospital privileges actions reported to the NPDB.145 According to the study, 
more than 65% of the study hospitals, including more than 250 large hospitals 
(those with 300 or more beds), reported no privileging actions during the 5 
142
 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, GAO-OI-130, supra  note 28, at 13. 
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 NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra  note 22, at 
22.  The report goes on to say that clinical privileges reporting seems to be 
concentrated in a few facilities and that the pattern may reflect a 
hospital's unwillingness to take reportable actions more than it reflects a 
concentration of problem physicians in a few hospitals. 
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 Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Hospital  Peer Review and  the National 
Practitioner Data Bank:     Clinical  Privileges Action Reports,   282 JAMA 349 
(Jul. 28, 1999). 
years under study.146 The study's conclusion suggested that the NPDB is a 
disincentive to effective peer review, pointing to fear of liability and 
preexisting personal and professional ties between the peer reviewers and 
their colleagues under review as barriers to its success. 
Although HRSA has not embarked on any definitive course of action to 
remedy the perceived low level of reported clinical privilege actions, the 
Administration did develop a model state adverse action reporting statute and 
model state regulations to address the issue.148 One suggested remedy to 
combat underreporting is to give HRSA the authority to penalize organizations 
for failure to report disciplinary actions similar to the penalty authority 
currently available for failure to report malpractice payments.149  HHS/OIG 
recommended seeking such authority for HRSA and, in fact, in June 2000 HRSA 
asked HHS to pursue legislation which would allow them to fine health care 
providers up to $25,000 for noncompliance.150 As HRSA pointed out, however, 
penalty authority alone will not suffice because HRSA also lacks the 
authority to gain access to confidential peer review records maintained by 
hospitals and other health care providers on practitioner performance.151 
Without such access (not to mention a skilled investigatory staff), they 
cannot ferret out noncompliant organizations, a necessary prerequisite to the 
imposition of fines. 
146
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147
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IV.   POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE PHYSICIAN 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
Fortunately or not, the abundant and widely reported problems which 
plague the NPDB seem to have vindicated those who opposed public access even 
if they were perhaps originally motivated by a more simple, somewhat selfish 
concept:  protection of one's own.  Following publication of the findings of 
the GAO study, an editorial comment in AMNews read:  "Widespread 
availability of [balanced and complete information about physicians] will 
effectively silence much of the political clamoring for opening access to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank to the public, and over time may make the 
inefficient and ill-conceived federal data bank irrelevant."152 
The AMA and AHA say that the NPDB's malpractice numbers would be 
misleading, and that clinical privileging and disciplinary actions would be 
better indicators of physician incompetence, but as previously discussed, 
there is strong reason to believe that the latter is considerably 
underreported to the NPDB.  Undoubtedly, this could be equally misleading to 
consumers.  The NPDB may have fallen far short of the ideal of providing 
accurate, useful information relative to a physician's competence to 
practice, but the demand for public access to physician-specific performance 
information remains.  The question is, what resource can  provide it? 
Two potential alternate sources for publicly available physician 
performance information were repeatedly mentioned during the ongoing debate 
over Representative Bliley's proposal:  state physician profiling systems and 
the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB).  States have historically 
152
 Editorial, GAO Reports  What Physicians Know:     National  Practitioner 
collected data on their licensees and with the growing popularity of the 
Internet, many have undertaken either mandatory or voluntary initiatives for 
physician profiling over the past several years.  The FSMB, an the other 
hand, is a private sector organization which has been collecting data from 
the various state medical boards for nearly 40 years.  Both were espoused as 
potential sources of the type of "balanced and complete" physician 
information that the public needs-, but as will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs, the AMA seems to have lost some of the enthusiasm with which they 
once embraced the notion of public access to the contents of the FSMB. 
A.  The Federation of State Medical Boards 
The Federation of State Medical Boards began in 1912 and its membership 
is comprised of the medical boards of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and 13 state boards of 
osteopathic medicine.154  The Federation is the parent organization of the 
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education and the Educational 
Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates, as well as a member organization of 
Data  Bank  is  Flawed,  American Medical News, Jan. 8, 2001, http://www.ama- 
assn.org/public/journals/amnews/amnews.htm. 
153
 AMA Board of Trustees Report, supra  note 7, at App. 1, § H-355.987 states, 
"The AMA affirms its support for the Federation of State Medical Boards 
Action Data Bank and calls for the dissolution of the National Practitioner 
Data Bank.".  Section H-355.985 of the report further states that "The AMA: 
(1) opposes all efforts to open the National Practitioner Data Bank to public 
access; [and] (2) strongly opposes public access to medical malpractice 
payment information in the National Practitioner Data Bank." 
154
 Federation of State Medical Boards, Facts,   at  http://www.fsmb.org (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2001).  The Department of Defense provides similar 
information to the Federation concerning its practitioners.  In fact, prior 
to the operation of the NPDB, the Department of the Navy used reports from 
the FSMB as part of its credentialing process.  Enclosure (4) of Sec. of the 
Navy Instruction 6320.23, "Credentials Review and Clinical Privileging of 
Health Care Providers," Feb. 7, 1990 states:  "Until such time as the NPDB is 
active, a report from the Federation of State Medical Boards, or equivalent 
professional clearing house for non-physicians will be included." 
the National Board of Medical Examiners.  Additionally, it was the founding 
member of the American Board of Medical Specialties and has a representative 
on the board of the National Commission on Certification of Physician 
Assistants.155 
In addition to numerous other activities, the Federation operates the 
Board Action Data Bank, which is a nationally recognized system for 
collecting, recording, and distributing data on disciplinary actions taken 
against licensees by state licensing and disciplinary boards, the Departments 
of Defense and Health and Human Services, and other regulatory bodies.156  In 
1998, for example, 4,520 actions (involving quality of care, sexual 
misconduct, insurance fraud, alcohol/substance abuse, and inappropriate 
prescribing of controlled substances) were reported to the Federation by 
medical boards, nearly 3,800 of which were prejudicial to the licensee.157 
Only hospitals, state medical boards, insurers, and government agencies have 
access to the Federation's data bank information, however. 
In response to the recent increased demand for public access to 
physician-specific information, in April 1999 the President of the Federation 
established the Special Committee on Physician Profiling.158 The committee's 
mission was to review current, publicly available physician profiling 
information, determine what information would be most helpful to the public, 




 Id.     According to the Federation's web site, "to be included in the 
[Federation's Board Action Data] Bank, an action must be a matter of public 
record or be legally releaseable to state medical boards or other entities 
with recognized authority to xeview physician credentials." Thus, the 
information duplicates that collected by any individual state medical board; 
the data bank's appeal lies in the comprehensive, multi-jurisdictional nature 





profile information, and make a recommendation as to whether or not the FSMB 
should use data from the All Licensed Physicians Data Bank to develop 
physician profiles for use by state medical boards and the public. 
During the summer and fall of 1999 and the winter of 2000, the 
committee reviewed statutes from states with mandated physician profiles and 
rules from states with voluntary profiling systems and considered 
recommendations made by various consumer advocacy groups.160 Not surprisingly, 
the committee quickly determined that there is no consistency in the types of 
physician-specific information reported from state to state, but in general, 
the committee found that the contents of mandated profiling systems were more 
comprehensive than their voluntary counterparts.161 
The committee compiled its information into a report to be used as a 
guide for state medical boards and others initiating physician profiling 
systems.162  The committee's suggestions were nearly identical to those 
provided in Representative Bliley' s bill.163  Profiles should contain only 
consumer-useful information; the data should be user-friendly, easily 
understood, and supported by contextual information to help consumers 
understand the significance of any specific data; and finally, only high 
quality, credible information subject to verification should be used.164 
159
 Id.     The All Licensed Physician's Project (ALPP) is designed to be a 
publicly accessible, Internet-based system that will collect and compile all 
actions by state medical boards.  Initial plans were that the ALPP would 
include biographical, educational, and licensure information on every 








 See supra  notes 2, 64-69 and accompanying text. 
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 Id. 
Despite having found no studies or market research indicating what 
consumers really want to know about physicians, but rather, only what 
consumer advocacy groups have lobbied for on behalf of their constituents, 
the committee nevertheless made several recommendations regarding the types 
of information which it felt would be of benefit to consumers.  The specific 
recommendations regarding medical malpractice payments and disciplinary 
actions are most pertinent to this report. 
w[H]ealth care consumers want access to physicians' medical malpractice 
experience because of the perception that knowing about malpractice judgments 
will allow them to make better decisions when choosing a physician."165 
According to the report, the committee's resulting recommendation regarding 
malpractice payment reports reflects its effort to "balance fairness to 
physicians with a desire to facilitate public disclosure and protection."166 
Because tort law and judicial procedures vary considerably from state-to- 
state, physician liability data is difficult to place in context outside of a 
state-based system.  Thus, the committee recommended contextual information 
highlighting several factors consumers should consider when evaluating 
medical malpractice reports.  However, they limited the recommended profile 
information to the number of medical malpractice court judgments and 
arbitration awards against the physician within the past 10 years and the 
number of malpractice settlements when that number is equal to or exceeds 3 






 Id.     The contextual factors include statements regarding the lack of 
correlation between malpractice payments and professional competence, the 
part that a physician's length and type of practice plays in the likelihood 
of having malpractice payments made on his behalf, that settlements made by 
insurance companies should not be construed as creating a presumption that 
medical malpractice has occurred, and that state medical boards which 
independently investigate malpractice claims may want to include a statement 
of awards, judgments and settlements should not be included for malpractice 
cases.16 
In the end, the "balance" recommended by the committee seemed 
more of an attempt to placate a curious public than a solution to using 
data bank information to make smart consumer choices.  A subsequent AMA 
Board of Trustees report indicated that despite what FSMB's Special 
Committee on Physician Profiling recommended in its report, the FSMB 
had no plans to include physician liability information in its Board 
Action Data Bank,169 and indeed, that has been the case. 
Although the FSMB's most valuable asset is the comprehensive, 
multi-jurisdictional nature of the information it collects, Kelly C. 
Alfred, the Manager of the All Licensed Physicians Project, stated that 
neither medical malpractice payment nor hospital disciplinary action 
reports will be available through the FSMB' s publicly accessible, 
"Doclnfo" web site.170  In fact, the Federation Physician Data Center, 
which is the supporting data base for both the Board Action Data Bank 
and the Doclnfo web site, "does not contain malpractice payment 
information, regardless of a state's ability to provide it."171 
in their profile that they do undertake such investigations and discipline in 
appropriate cases. 
168
 Id.     The committee's reason for excluding this specific information mirrors 
that made by other organizations who opposed public access to the NPDB, 
specifically, that dollar amounts are unreliable predictors of physician 
competence, particularly in the absence of contextual information. 
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 E-mail from Kelly C. Alfred, Manager, All Licensed Physicians Project, 
Federation of State Medical Boards, to Connie Bullock (Mar. 30, 2001, 
10:11:58 CST) (on file with author). 
Likewise, hospital disciplinary actions will only become part of 
the Federation's supporting data bank in limited situations.  The 
Federation's Special Committee on Physician Profiling stated that 
disciplinary actions taken by state medical boards as well as 
disciplinary actions taken by hospitals which are required to be 
reported to state medical board should be included in a profile. 
Unfortunately, not all states require reports of hospital disciplinary 
actions.  At present, hospital disciplinary action against a 
practitioner is only reported to the FSMB when the action results in 
state medical board action as well. 
Thus, although a consumer will be able to access educational, 
biographical, and comprehensive licensure information through FSMB's 
Doclnfo web site, both medical malpractice payment reports and hospital 
disciplinary measures — the two components that were thought to be so 
important to physician regulation that they became the impetus for the 
NPDB — will remain outside of their grasp through any comprehensive 
data base. 
Doclnfo has had few queries, perhaps due in part to its cost 
($9.95 per physician query) and the fact that the FSMB has not 
publicized its availability.  This lack of public response seems to 
please the AMA.  In a turnaround from his Congressional testimony last 
year, AMA President-elect Richard Corlin, M.D., recently stated that 
the AMA is not thrilled with the open door policy of the FSMB data 
bank, but that they would not fight it, adding, "it will be a better 
source of data than the NPDB."172  Conversely, the Public Citizen's 
172
 AMNews Staff, FSMB Grants  Public Access  to its  Physician data Bank: 
Information  on Disciplinary Actions Against  Physicians  Will  Now be Available 
Health Research Group (HRG) continues to push to have the NPDB opened 
to the public, adding that the federation likely opened its data bank 
"to make money."173 
In the end, the FSMB's publicly accessible data bank information 
is nothing more than a national collection of data that most state 
boards currently collect.  Many states have made significant strides to 
provide physician-specific performance information via the Internet, 
with varying degrees of success.  The next section will discuss the 
status of such initiatives. 
B.  State Initiatives 
States have historically tracked physician information and are the 
primary source of information about physicians they regulate.174  In 
February 2000, the Public Citizen's Health Research Group (HRG) 
published the results of a survey they had conducted involving 51 
medical boards (representing the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia) and their current state of Internet-accessible disciplinary 
information.175  Like the Special Committee on Physician Profiling, HRG 
found that the types of information provided varies greatly from state- 
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Citizen, Washington, DC, Feb. 2000, at 
http://www.citizen.org/hrg/PUBLICATIONS/1506.htm. 
to-state176 and of all 51 boards studied, only Maryland provided what HRG 
considered "adequate" Internet-accessible information. 
In order to be considered adequate by the surveyors, the 
information had to include the doctor's name, the offense committed, 
the disciplinary action taken, a summary narrative of the misconduct, 
and the full text of the board order.178  The survey discovered that 
forty-one state medical boards name disciplined doctors on their web 
sites, 24 of which were given grades of "B" for content, with the 
remaining 26 earning anywhere from a "C" to an "X" depending upon the 
adequacy of information provided.179  Of the 10 boards that provide no 
doctor-specific disciplinary action (representing 14 million patients), 
seven had no web site at all at the time of the survey, and five of the 
ten said they planned to have sites with disciplinary action 
information by mid-2000.180 
Interestingly, HRG did find four state sites  which report hospital 
disciplinary actions against physicians (California, Florida, Idaho, 
and Massachusetts).  The same four states, plus Tennessee, provide data 
176
 For example, retroactivity of disciplinary data on the web sites ranged 
from one to 10 years, and there was no consistency on the frequency with 
which each board updates disciplinary data on their web site or how the data 
is managed when a board action is vacated, remanded, or overruled by a court. 
Likewise, "user-friendliness" of web sites varied greatly, causing HRG to 
recommend that patients be able to retrieve data simply by entering the 
physician's name or license number. 
177




 Id.     States providing all five types of data earned a content grade 
of "A"; states providing four types of data earned a "B", three types 
of data earned a "C", two types of data earned a "D", and states that 
named disciplined physicians but provided no details received an "F." 
States without web sites or those which reported no doctor-specific 
disciplinary information on their web site earned an "X." One 
suggested explanation for those with inadequate sites is a lack of 
adequate funding for the projects. 
180
 Id. 
on malpractice claims, adding that in HRG's opinion, "all states should 
include such data."181 
Although HRG continues to push for a publicly accessible, 
comprehensive, nationally-based data bank (like the NPDB), their survey 
resulted in several general recommendations for states to follow in 
setting up and maintaining their own web sites.  HRG listed seven 
recommendations geared toward ensuring that all states adopt minimum, 
uniform standards that ensure sufficient information is provided on any 
reported action; that the information be provided in a user-friendly 
format; and that the information be comprehensive, current, and 




 Id.     The specific recommendations include: 
(1) Each board should have a web site that links to a database of 
physician information. For each physician disciplined by the 
board, the information should include the action taken by the 
board, the offense committed by the physician, and a summary 
narrative of the physician's misconduct. The database should 
also feature links to the full text of board orders and other 
public documents related to the action. 
(2) This information should be provided for all disciplinary 
actions taken in the last ten years. 
(3) Public access to disciplinary data should be preserved even 
when a physician's license is suspended, revoked, or expired. 
(4) Patients should be able to retrieve data by entering a 
physician's name and/or license number in a search engine. 
(5) Disciplinary action information should be updated as 
frequently as the boards meet to consider actions (usually 
once a month.) 
(6) If a court overrules or vacates a board action and exonerates 
the physician and the court decision is final, then 
information on that action should be removed from the 
database.  While an appeal is pending, or while a remanded 
action is being considered, information on the action and the 
court's decision should be reported in the database. 
(7) Any changes in a physician's record resulting from a court 
decision should be made within two weeks of the court ruling. 
recommendations in hopes that their efforts would prompt states into 
creating web sites that would be maximally useful to their respective 
residents. 
CONCLUSION 
Public access to relevant information on physician selection and 
performance can lead to more intelligent consumer health care choices.  With 
the availability of the Internet, data bank information on physicians and 
other health care practitioners could be easily accessed with a few computer 
keystrokes.  At the present time, however, there is neither adequate support 
for nor convincing reasons to open the NPDB to the public. 
Health care professionals and related organizations proclaim the 
potential benefits of publicly accessible, physician-specific information, 
but then immediately point out the limitations they feel are necessary.  More 
often than not, these powerful organizations successfully block any 
initiatives to expand either content or access to currently available data 
banks, including the NPDB.  Whether driven by true beneficence or, as is more 
likely the case, a combination of professional and personal motivations, they 
were nevertheless correct in their opposition to a publicly accessible NPDB. 
Although opponents argue that the NPDB's malpractice payment reporting 
process for the civilian sector is over-inclusive, the key is in finding the 
right balance between the databank's legislative mandate and the health care 
professionals' outcry for fairness.  This paper suggests that the peer review 
method currently employed within the DoD seems to be an appropriate starting 
point.  While cynics might argue that such a process is akin to the "fox 
guarding the chicken coop," peer review is not subject to the "gaming" that 
would accompany the settlement process if arbitrary reporting thresholds were 
set (i.e, settling for an amount just below the reporting requirement) or if 
reports were only made for those with multiple malpractice payments in their 
history.  Furthermore, the DoD comparative statistics presented in this paper 
seem to indicate that the appropriate use of a peer review process prior to 
reporting to the NPDB results in greater fairness in the overall reporting 
process.  HRSA points out, however, that implementation of a proposal to use 
a peer review process similar to DoD could require additional congressional 
action since the NPDB's authorizing legislation does not provide for it.183 
Likewise, expanded penalty authority (not to mention the willingness to 
use it) in the area of clinical privileges action reporting would greatly 
benefit the usefulness and credibility of the NPDB.  The progress of any 
regulatory approach such as this has been generally delayed by the recent 
change in Administration,184 but such authority need not be limited to the 
federal level.  In fact, an analysis of the association between state-imposed 
penalties for failure to report and the level of reporting to NPDB led to the 
conclusion that states with the strongest penalties also had higher reporting 
figures.185  In the meantime, HRSA's Quality Assurance Division has indicated 
that they have taken on a more proactive approach in reminding health care 
entities of their reporting obligations.186 
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Continuing support by consumer advocacy groups will likely result in 
future proposals to open the NPDB to the public.  However, without 
significant changes to the data bank, both in its operation and its contents, 
such proposals cannot succeed.  In the meantime, if the consumer is shopping 
for comprehensive data on his or her physician - - not necessarily in scope, 
but from a jurisdictional standpoint - - and is willing to pay the fairly 
steep price, he can now access the FSMB's Doclnfo database.187  For those who 
aren't yet willing to pay that amount, but who are willing to devote a bit 
more time to their research, most states, if not all at the time of this 
report, have their own Internet accessible physician profiling systems. 
While such data banks are limited in that they provide only their own 
jurisdiction's information, with adequate funding and legislative support, 
some have been able to provide malpractice payment data and hospital 
disciplinary information at minimal cost to the consumer.  Many state medical 
boards even provide free Internet access to their data banks. 
Although it is clearly impossible to support any proposal that the NPDB 
be thrown open to the public in its current condition, it is equally clear 
that the time is fast approaching when savvy consumers will demand access to 
it.  It is the single, most comprehensive source of not just the physician 
information consumers want to have, but information they need to make health 
care decisions.  With procedural revisions and much-needed emphasis on 
increasing the reliability of its contents, the NPDB fulfill its goal of 
improving the quality of health care, not just from an institutional 
perspective, but from a consumer perspective as well. 
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